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Administration Versus Extermination: The Wehrmacht’s Initiatives Toward Executing the
Final Solution Between the Eastern and Western Fronts

In addition to the Third Reich’s rapid territorial conquest and acquisition of Lebensraum
during the Second World War, Adolf Hitler employed Germany’s military forces in his greater
war against world Jewry. Hitler’s obsession with the Final Solution to the Jewish Question quickly
became one of the leading tasks for not only the Nazi SS and Einsatzgruppen, but also the regular
German Wehrmacht. Initially tasked with swiftly defeating the Western Allies--i.e. France and
Britain--through its rapid Blitzkrieg tactics, the Wehrmacht successfully conquered and occupied
most of Western Europe by the summer of 1940. Following the invasion of the Soviet Union in
June of 1941, Hitler tasked the Wehrmacht with rounding up and shooting Jews in addition to their
military objectives; the first steps of the Final Solution. Between 1941 and 1944, the Wehrmacht
became increasingly involved with locating, deporting, and killing local Jewish populations across
the Eastern Front. However, this could not be said for the same Wehrmacht forces which invaded
the West one year earlier, even after the establishment of their militarized, occupational regimes.
Why were Wehrmacht soldiers on the Western Front less actively involved in the rounding up,
shooting, and deportation of Jews? If not German soldiers, who, then, were the intended
perpetrators of the Final Solution in the West and how did they factor into the larger picture of
Hitler’s genocidal initiatives?
On the Western Front--albeit not militarily active again until the Western Allies’ counterattack in 1944--the Wehrmacht’s contribution to the Final Solution was limited to a sort of
administrative occupation. This entailed the Wehrmacht occupational command’s skeptically
monitored, and even mitigated, persecution of local Jews in countries like France and Belgium.
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This system relied greatly upon Jewish deportations to the East for mass extermination in the
concentration camps. These efforts, however, were often squandered in favor of maintaining public
order and collaborator complacency with the German occupation authorities. Whereas, on the
psychologically brutalized and physically daunting Eastern Front, the Third Reich enacted a war
of extermination against world Jewry. This demanded--but did not force--the active contribution
of the Wehrmacht in achieving Hitler’s goals. Indeed, Hitler viewed the Eastern Front as the
symbolic, real war due to its immense political implications toward the success of Nazism over
world Jewry. Seemingly neglecting the tactical significance of all other fronts, the centrality of
Hitler’s hatred toward the Jews and Slavs elevated the supposed necessity and stakes of a war in
the East. The Wehrmacht’s contribution toward executing the Final Solution was not uniform
between the Eastern and Western fronts. Therefore, it is important to analyze what influenced the
Wehrmacht’s distinct operational environments for committing to Jewish annihilation.
Historiographically, the study of the Wehrmacht’s involvement in the Final Solution
focuses primarily on the forces of the Eastern Front. Most first-hand accounts of soldiers and units
who participated in the extermination of Jews are from those who served in the East. As a result
of the intensely brutalized warfare along the Eastern Front, these soldier accounts are more
psychologically daunting, making for an excellent study into the men’s motivations to kill.
Through the extensive work of historians like Omer Bartov, Bryce Sait, and Stephen Fritz, veterans
of the Eastern Front voice their experiences to a broad audience while placing them into a greater
retrospective, reflective context. Supporting these scholars, historians Thomas Kühne, Lisa Pine,
and Christopher Browning provide thorough, interpretive analyses of soldiers’ motivations and
underlying influences along the front. Most importantly, Kühne’s landmark research on German
soldierly comradeship studies the intangible bonds between German soldiers fighting along the
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Eastern Front. Forged out of the psychological trauma and paranoia of combat in the East, Kühne’s
concept of comradeship factors into most scholars’ analyses of German soldiers’ participation in
the Nazis’ genocidal project. Coinciding with soldierly comradeship, Pine and Browning provide
additional interpretations encompassing German standards for masculinity, a sense of duty, and
psychological brutalization against the enemy. Thus, helping scholars better understand the
psychological impact of Hitler’s eastern war of extermination on its perpetrators as well as the
motivations of Wehrmacht soldiers to commit mass murder.
As for the Wehrmacht and Final Solution on the Western Front, few first-hand or administrative accounts reveal the centrality of German soldiers to Jewish persecution. Most soldier
accounts from the West focus on the military, tactical aspects of combat against the British and
French in 1940 and then the Americans, British, and Canadians in 1944--the Western Allies. They
make little mention of German combatants’ widespread interaction with, let alone mass killing of,
local Jewish populations. The purpose of this study is to examine the processes for disseminating
orders and undertaking attacks on Jews between the Eastern and Western Fronts. In the East, orders
were disseminated from the top--Hitler and the Wehrmacht high command--and executed by those
from below, particularly rank and file soldiers. Whereas, in the West, orders were disseminated
from the top, but remained near the top as German occupation and collaborationist officials--or
administrators--mandated the persecution, roundup, and deportation of Jews. Thus, providing the
structural basis for the German military’s administrative occupation approach to Jewish
persecution in the West. Through broader studies of the Third Reich during the Second World
War, historians like Ben Shepherd provide a more cohesive analysis of German occupational
authorities’ efforts to appease--or rather mitigate--the Final Solution in the West. Particularly in
Belgium and France, Shepherd details how German occupational governments were slow to
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radicalize their campaigns of Jewish persecution, despite Hitler’s demands. Recognizing the
reluctance of French and Belgian collaborationist regimes to partake in the racialized, widespread
persecution of Jews, German occupational authorities made compromises to appease Hitler’s
initiatives whilst mitigating friction with local populations. The resulting destruction of local
Jewish populations in these two countries was far less severe compared to the East. Similar to how
Kühne, Pine, and Browning provide analytical support to the study of soldiers on the Eastern Front,
scholars such as Michael Marrus, Robert Paxton, and Philippe Carrard offer more abstract analyses
of the psychological forces at play in the West. Focusing largely on France, these scholars study
the perspective, subjective, and particularly cultural disconnects between the Vichy French and
Hitler’s genocidal project. That is, certain humanist--even judicious--aspects of French culture and
dignity hindered Vichy officials’ willingness to buy into Hitler’s indiscriminate persecution of
Jews. Such abstract analyses provide an indirect route toward understanding the complicated,
delicate interaction between the German occupiers and local collaborationist regimes.
Nearly all noncombatant accounts from the Western Front depict the Germans’ reliance on
Jewish deportations to the East as well as an immensely administrative system for organizing
Jewish persecution. Few sources draw this analysis, but it is clear the Nazi regime sought to contain
the brunt of its genocidal crimes to the East; the homeland of the inhumanly portrayed people it
sought to annihilate. With the construction of most concentration camps across Central and Eastern
Europe, Hitler’s enormous killing operation was clearly centered far beyond the borders of the
West. Therefore, the process of executing the Final Solution in the West resorted to exporting their
share of the Jewish Question eastward. This kept local killings and reprisals to a relative minimum
despite many collaborationists’ aversion to Hitler’s extensive demands. Many accounts from
German occupation officials in Belgium and France discuss internal conflicts over the roundup
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and deportation of Jews, but rarely of their localized extermination. This alleviated the regular rank
and file of the Wehrmacht from enacting local shooting operations or solely operating the
deportation system as they were expected in the East. The Nazi regime expected local
collaborationist regimes and their German administrative overlords to cooperate diligently toward
rounding up and deporting Western European Jews eastward for extermination. Although, such
genocidal idealism could not stray further from the reality of the Western Front’s delicate
occupational dynamics.
This study bridges the scholarly gap between historians’ understanding of the Final
Solution in the West and the historiographically developed East. It examines how the
psychological devastation and paranoia described by Kühne, Browning, and Fritz on the Eastern
Front saw no appropriate counterpart in the West. Instead, it utilizes the arguments of Marrus,
Paxton, and Carrard to analyze collaborationist resistance to the Nazis’ genocidal project. Thus,
fostering a unique interpretation of how German and collaborationist officials perpetrated the Final
Solution in the West--via administrative occupations--compared to the well documented war of
extermination in the East.

The Eastern Front and the War of Extermination

Firstly, it is important to analyze the Wehrmacht’s ideological indoctrination into the Nazi
regime’s political agenda. By the outbreak of war in September of 1939, asserts historian Omer
Bartov, “the fighting spearhead of the Third Reich was composed of men who spent their formative
years of their youth under National Socialism.”1 That is, “most of the men who served as the

Omer Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (Oxford,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), 108-109.
1
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Wehrmacht’s combat troops during the Second World War were either children or teenagers when
Hitler came to power in 1933.”2 This new, rising generation of soldiers enabled the Nazi regime
and military command to preemptively educate Wehrmacht troops on the ideals of Nazism in
relation to their military duties. German Armed Forces Minister, General Werner von Blomberg,
“wanted [the Wehrmacht] to become a highly politicized fighting force, and he viewed the
education of the rank and file as the most crucial step in achieving this goal.”3 Thus, the Wehrmacht
enacted “a considerable effort to[ward] the...National Socialist education of the troops” by
“instilling into them a mystical belief in Hitler.”4 This educational process was executed in two
stages. The first instructed soldiers to forever “trust Hitler’s political and military wisdom, and
never to doubt either the morality of his orders or the outcome of his prophecies.” 5 The second
stage portrayed “an image of the enemy [that is, many enemies] which so profoundly distorted [the
troops’] perception” of the actual threats such ‘monstrous’ entities posed to the Third Reich.6
Without extensive combat experience, the Wehrmacht’s ideological indoctrination was intended
to both motivate troops based upon irrational prejudices as well as brutalize them according to the
violent agenda of Hitler’s regime. Bartov argues that “faith in Hitler allowed one to believe in the
essential moral value of the most heinous crimes,” bringing a sense of legitimacy to “one’s own
sacrifices and the atrocities committed against the enemy.”7 Essentially, these young men were
trained and educated through a curriculum tailored to produce the type of soldier necessary to
perpetrate Hitler’s genocidal initiatives.

2

Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 108.
Bryce Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht: Nazi Ideology and War Crimes of the German Military (Oxford,
NY: Berghahn Books, 2019), 41.
4
Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 118.
5 Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 118.
6
Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 118.
7
Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 118.
3

https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol8/iss1/2

6

Calcaterra: Administration Versus Extermination

German military success in the early years of the Second World War bolstered an upsurge
in ideological vigor prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. With the success of the
Wehrmacht’s Blitzkrieg on the Western Front, Bartov notes how the “celebration of the irrational,
this cult of the Führer, reached its peak following the victory over France” in 1940.8 Even within
the final year of the war, accounts from German troops indicate a relatively undeterred devotion
to the cult of the Führer. In American military surveys conducted with German POWs between
August and December of 1944, “two-thirds of [the POWs] expressed ‘belief’ in the Führer.”9 The
surveys also revealed “that there was little defeatist talk amongst the [German] troops, and that
‘[t]here is a firm conviction that the tremendous military efforts of [their] people will lead [them]
to victory.’”10 Apart from wartime nationalism, such unwavering devotion to their nation and
leader--especially from captured, defeated POWs--remained widespread even after the war was no
longer in Germany’s favor. Through their devotion to Hitler and Germany, these soldiers proved
both their willingness and determination to carry out the directives of their superiors.
Whether it be the 1944-45 Ardennes Counteroffensive or rounding up Jews in Poland in
1939-43, the soldiers of the Wehrmacht--at least the majority--willingly pursued the daunting tasks
at hand. In summary, Bartov concludes that “the Wehrmacht’s barbarous policies were...utilized
for propagandistic purposes” and “provid[ed] a vivid and frightening model of what Germany
itself could expect in defeat.”11 The unwavering devotion of German soldiers to their nation,
people, and leader was viewed as a common necessity. Within the Kampfgemeinschaft, or ‘fighting
community,’ the Wehrmacht convinced its recruits “that they were fighting a justified and

8

Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 122.
Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 145.
10
Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 145.
11
Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 126.
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necessary war against racial and political enemies.”12 Thus, historian Lisa Pine concludes that
German soldiers’ “veneration of Hitler and their readiness to embrace the racist goals of his
government turned these young recruits into ‘tenacious, increasingly brutalized, and fanaticized
soldiers.’”13 Lest these brave German combatants fail, Hitler preached, Germany itself would fall
victim to the many enemies seeking its destruction.
Moreover, it is necessary to address the strategic, ideological differences between the
Eastern and Western fronts as well as their underlying significance to National Socialism.
Embedded within the Wehrmacht’s ideological training regimen, the Nazi regime sought to instill
in its soldiers the same preconceived prejudices preached by Hitler. Beginning in 1935, the
Wehrmacht educational curriculum incorporated manuals on topics such as ‘The National Socialist
World-view,’ ‘The Military as the Instrument of the Führer’s Political Will,’ ‘The Protection of
the German Race,’ and ‘The Ordering of the German People’s Land,’ referencing the acquisition
of Lebensraum in the East.14 The intended purpose of these early manuals “sought to foster
aggression towards those [the Nazi regime] considered different, presenting these ‘others’ as
essential threats” to the Volksgemeinschaft, or German ‘National Community.’15 The political
education of Wehrmacht soldiers directed such prejudice outward onto foreign, non-German
populations which harbored the enemies of the Third Reich.
Predictably, at the root of all Nazi hatred and prejudice were the Jews. Wehrmacht
educational manuals, including ‘The Destructive Influence of Jews’ and ‘The Genocidal Jewish
Bolshevist Regime in Moscow,’ “referred to Jews as ‘parasites’ who needed to be ‘radically

Lisa Pine, “Men, Masculinity and the Wehrmacht,” in Hitler’s ‘National Community’: Society and Culture in
Nazi Germany, Second Edition, 89-101 (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishers, 2017), 95.
13
Pine, “Men, Masculinity and the Wehrmacht,” in Hitler’s ‘National Community’, 95-96.
14 Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 44.
15
Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 44.
12
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eliminated from the sphere of German life.’”16 In the attempt to radicalize such prejudice, the
Wehrmacht’s “curriculum also spoke of the soldiers’ task of combating ‘World Jewry’ beyond
Germany’s borders” by “implementing a ‘new, radical solution to the Jewish Question.’”17 Such
early rhetoric clearly alludes to Hitler’s desire to implement the Wehrmacht into the mass
extermination of Jews. Therefore, Wehrmacht soldiers were raised as the intended perpetrators of
Hitler’s Final Solution. This task was further explained by manuals such as Dr. C.A. Hoberg’s
‘The Jew in German History’ which “emphasized [Jewish] ‘otherness’ and status as an existential
threat” to the Volksgemeinschaft.18 Manuals like that of Hoberg “attempted to place as much
psychological distance as possible between soldiers and members of the ‘Jewish race’” through
the use of “‘racial antisemitism.’”19 This radicalized antisemitism was geared primarily toward the
East where the Nazi regime argued Judaism and Soviet communism festered in unison: the two
leading sources of inhuman filth located in one vague geographic region. As proof of the Jews’
parasitic, bloodsucking, and even monstrous control over Bolshevism and the Soviet Union to the
East, Dr. Hoberg quoted the writings of Vladimir Lenin. He cited Lenin’s claim that Russia had
“‘few intelligent people’” since Russians “‘are a predominantly talented people, but [are] lazy
when it comes to thinking.’”20 Critically, Lenin admitted that “‘the intelligent person among the
Russians is almost always the Jew, or a person with a mixture of Jewish blood.’”21 With this
bombshell admission, Hoberg asserted “how strong the influence of Jewry [on] Bolshevism was
from the beginning” as the Jews “attained the[ir] authoritative position of power” in “control [of]

16

Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 44.
Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 44.
18 Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 70-71.
19
Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 70-71.
20 Vladimir Lenin in Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 153.
21 Lenin in Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 153.
17
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all areas of [Russia’s] public life and politics.”22 According to such subjective justification, Hoberg
and the Nazi regime argued that the greater war against world Jewry and the subversion of National
Socialism lay in the East.
For many soldiers, the Wehrmacht’s National Socialist curriculum succeeded in reforming
their preconceived racial and cultural notions of the East. In a letter from one Corporal in the 111th
Mountain Artillery Regiment written shortly after the invasion of Poland, the Wehrmacht’s efforts
to instill irrational hatred of Eastern European Jews surges to the forefront. He wrote how local
Jews were “beasts in the flesh” and how “their beards and kaftans, with their devilish
grimaces...made a ghastly impression upon [his Regiment].”23 The Corporal concluded by stating
how it was “no wonder that after twenty years the Polish state has become victim to these [Jewish]
parasites.”24 Echoing the fierce, racial antisemitism of the Wehrmacht’s educational curriculum,
this nameless Corporal exemplified the ideologically preconditioned soldier of Blomberg’s
politicized Wehrmacht. Another soldier in the 35th Infantry Division rejoiced following the
German invasion into the East. He marked it as “the first reaction...to make Europe Europe again,
and Germany into a Reich of all those of Germanic origins,” nearly 2,000 years after “the first
intrusion of Jews and their religion in Europe.”25 Bolstered by military success, soldiers saw their
Wehrmacht propaganda as the prophetic truth. In an even more irrational display of hatred, LanceCorporal Paul Lenz lamented how “‘only a Jew can be a Bolshevik,’” concluding that “‘for this
blood-sucker there can be nothing nicer than to be a Bolshevik.’”26 These self-assured truths were
only reaffirmed after the German military’s arrival in Eastern Europe--particularly Poland early

22

C.A. Hoberg in Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 153.
Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 81.
24
Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 81.
25
Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 82.
26
Paul Lenz in Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 160.
23
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on--justifying their duties to the will of the Führer. As Bartov summarizes, military propaganda
on the Eastern Front “did not make [all German soldiers] into committed Nazis; but it provided
them with an outlook which profoundly influenced their manner of both physically and mentally
coping with and reacting to the realities of the war.”27 The Wehrmacht’s reassuring propaganda
“equipped [soldiers] with...a social Darwinian division of humanity” which they applied to life
and death between us Germans and the other, the vile enemy, Judeo-Bolsheviks.28 Under this
mindset, Blomberg ideologically preconditioned the soldiers of the Wehrmacht for the radicalized
war Hitler aimed to launch in the East.
The Eastern Front took on the projection of a monumental battle between the good of
National Socialism and the evils of Judeo-Bolshevism. Summarizing Hitler’s goals for his armed
forces in March of 1941--three months before the invasion of the Soviet Union--Wehrmacht
General Franz Halder revealed the Führer’s intent for a war in the East. Quoting Hitler, Halder
wrote how Germany was “not fighting a war in order to conserve the enemy,” but rather “a war of
extermination” against the “tremendous danger” of Judeo-Bolshevism to the East.29 Further
echoing Hitler’s comments, Halder wrote how “Bolshevism…[was] the equivalent of social
delinquency” and that “Communism [was] a tremendous danger for the future” of Nazi Germany.30
It was clear that the impending Eastern Front would be a battle of fundamentally opposed
ideologies fueled by Hitler’s intensified and extremely irrational racial antisemitism. In the official
‘Directives for the Behavior of the Troops in Russia’ issued in May of 1941, the Wehrmacht high
command rearticulated the ruthlessness Hitler desired for his eastern war of extermination. The

27

Omer Bartov in Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 181.
Bartov in Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 181.
29
Franz Halder in J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, vol. 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial
Extermination: A Document Reader (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001), 483.
30
Halder in Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, vol. 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination, 483.
28
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directives ordered “ruthless and energetic action [be taken] against Bolshevik agitators, guerrillas,
saboteurs, and Jews, and the total elimination of all active or passive resistance.” 31 The directives
also depicted “the Asiatic soldiers of the Red Army” as “devious, cunning, and without feeling”
as well as how “Jewry is strongly represented in the USSR” since the Soviet Union was “held
together by [its] Bolshevik rulers by force.”32 Through such blatant, pointed rhetoric, the Nazi
regime deemed unbridled hatred necessary in maintaining the troops’ ferocity against their Soviet
--and indisputably Jewish-controlled--adversaries. Furthermore, the strategic reasoning behind an
invasion of the Soviet Union was depicted as “a preventative measure...thwart[ing] the
approaching invasion of [Germany by] ‘Asiatic barbarism,’ led by ‘Judeo-Bolshevism” with the
goal of “devastating Europe and destroying its ‘culture.’”33 Justified by such irrational paranoia,
the German political and military command sought “to eradicate the Soviet enemy’s ‘power basis’
--that is, the communists and the Jews.”34 Hitler and the Wehrmacht were then poised to commence
a symbolic war of extermination in the East; the real war was on the horizon.
However, with the launch of Operation Barbarossa in June of 1941, the unindoctrinated
reality of warfare in Eastern Europe fed the irrational prejudices of many Wehrmacht soldiers. As
historian Bryce Sait explains, the Eastern Front presented the Wehrmacht a cultural environment
“that was unfamiliar, and seen by many [soldiers] as being primitive and backward.” 35 Under the
paranoia of war, “this hostile and alien environment made for confusion, nervousness and bouts of
panic” amongst the troops fighting on or near the front.36 Such widespread uneasiness complicated
the fighting along the front and dramatically blurred the lines between the resistance of Soviet

31

Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, vol. 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination, 487.
Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, vol. 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination, 487.
33 Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 131.
34
Bartov, “The Distortion of Reality,” in Hitler’s Army, 131.
35 Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 88.
36
Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 88.
32
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military personnel and local partisans. As the fighting on the Eastern Front intensified, the
Wehrmacht’s ideological and political education “supplemented official orders by attempting to
inculcate its men with the notion that ‘the Jew’ was implicated in each act of resistance by the
Soviet population.”37 Soldiers on the front increasingly believed the Jews were not only controlling
the monstrous Soviet state, but also commanded the psychologically daunting guerrilla war that
was undermining German confidence. In the Wehrmacht propaganda department’s newsletter,
Mitteilungen für die Truppe (News for the Troops), military propagandists attempted to reinstate
German confidence along the front while reaffirming Hitler’s goals in the East. In its first issue,
the newsletter reaffirmed that “‘the goal [of Hitler’s war in the East] is to wipe out the species of
subhuman Red represented by the rulers in Moscow’”; the Judeo-Bolsheviks or, more directly, the
Jews.38 The propagandists then “made it clear to German soldiers...that they were members of a
Herrenvolk, a ‘master race’” while “blunt[ing] their scruples [with killing] and feelings of guilt
likely to surface in conjunction with such brutality.”39 To make the process of killing--even mass
killing--easier, the Wehrmacht’s racist propaganda “creat[ed] a psychological distance between
German soldiers and [their] enemies through [the] continual denigration and dehumanization of
the latter.”40 Even as German propagandists attempted to reassure soldiers of their righteous duties
in the East, members of the Wehrmacht knew the Eastern Front was going to remain a bloody,
daunting battle.
Many Wehrmacht soldiers correctly assessed why Germany’s war against the Soviets was
so psychologically devastating. In one reflective account from the front, soldiers were dumb-

37

Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 153.
Wolfram Wette, “The Wehrmacht and the Murder of Jews,” in The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality, 90-138,
translated by Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 98-99.
39 Wette, “The Wehrmacht and the Murder of Jews,” in The Wehrmacht, 99-100.
40
Wette, “The Wehrmacht and the Murder of Jews,” in The Wehrmacht, 100.
38
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founded by the continuous “wave[s] of futile attacks” by the Red Army, how “Soviet troops
climb[ed] over rows and rows of their dead comrades,” and how whole “battalions...sacrifice[d]
themselves in order to clear a path for [subsequent] attacks.”41 The account concluded that “it is
not enough to blame the political commissars”--the typical personnel blamed for ‘Jewish
influence’ in the Red Army--since “something else makes the Soviet soldier dangerous in battle.”42
Writing from the front in January of 1942, Lieutenant Helmut von Harnack offered a
comprehensive answer to this open inquiry. Harnack recognized “‘the extreme modesty of the
personal needs of the Russian soldier, who in his mixture of doggedness and toughness possesses
an enormous power of resistance.’”43 Reducing Harnack’s analysis down to the bluntest of terms,
one Private claimed he had “‘never yet seen such tough dogs as the Russians.’” 44 Not entirely
blinded by hatred, many Wehrmacht soldiers understood and respected their Soviet adversaries’
tenacity and psychological vigor. Although, little could stop the Nazi regime from assigning blame
to the Jews for the ferocity of Soviet resistance. Nazi officials professed how the Jews utilized the
immense Soviet population as “‘a mass of people who could provide ideal cannon fodder [in] their
quest for world domination.’”45 Thus, German soldiers were taught to regard “the deaths of Soviet
citizens [with] little consequence, since Soviets themselves saw little value in human life.”46
Representing the first psychological barrier constructed by troops along the front, indifference to
the deaths of Soviet combatants--both military and civilian--actively brutalized men to warfare in
the East. According to historian Hannes Heer, “the anti-partisan campaign stripped German

41

Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 154.
Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 154.
43 Helmut von Harnack in Stephen G. Fritz, Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II (Lexington, KY:
University of Kentucky Press, 1995), 60.
44
Fritz, Frontsoldaten, 60.
45 Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 154.
46
Sait, The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, 154.
42
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soldiers of all civilized norms” and “replac[ed] them with an ‘extermination mentality’ directed
against the enemy population as a whole.”47 This rapid brutalization bolstered the perceived
necessity of Hitler’s eastern war of extermination as well as ordinary soldiers’ willingness to
perpetrate mass murder.
As the German Blitzkrieg stalled just miles outside Moscow, Hitler’s war in the East
morphed into both an ideological and physical battle of attrition, challenging the Wehrmacht’s
preconceived notions of military superiority over the Soviet Union. The treacherous fighting on
the Eastern Front “rapidly eroded German material strength” as “casualties accumulated at a
terrifying rate,” pressing the military’s propaganda machine to shift “from ecstatic to frantic, often
verging on the hysterical.”48 Bartov asserts that since “technology and skill were now…
increasingly replaced by devotion and fanaticism, [so were] rational thought by ‘blind’ belief.”49
Realizing the desperation of warfare in the East, soldiers and officers alike turned to their
ideological training and vested their undivided faith in Hitler’s campaign. Such fanatical devotion
threatened soldiers’ psychological endurance on the front, paving the way for further brutalization.
These concerns were noted by the head of the German Eighth Army, General Johannes Blaskowitz,
in reference to the psychological health of his men. Blaskowitz “worried about the possible effect
of the [mass] killings on discipline among his own men, fearing ‘immeasurable brutalization and
moral debasement.’”50 Again, despite some concerned murmurs amongst the German military
command, the Nazi regime refused to back down from its destined battle against JudeoBolshevism in the East. In the April 1942 issue of the Mitteilungen für das Offizierkorps--the
officer corps’ news-sheet--commanders in the East professed that “‘in the struggle against the
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capitalism and imperialism of the English and the Americans and against…the Bolsheviks[,] the
weapons of the Wehrmacht alone will not achieve victory.’”51 Instead, the news-sheet proclaimed
that victory can be attained “‘only...when the people...confronts the political and ideological theses
of the enemy with better political concepts...based on the German people’s unshakable sense of
loyalty to Führer, Volk, and Fatherland.’”52 Coupling blind devotion to Hitler’s ambivalence with
soldiers’ rapid brutalization, the Eastern Front devolved into a psychological apocalypse. An
apocalypse dominated by death where the death of an enemy was deemed necessary in reprisal for
the death of a comrade.

The Western Front and Administrative Occupations

Unlike the symbolic, real war on the Eastern Front, Hitler viewed the Western Front more
so as an unfortunate side effect of Germany’s otherwise justified military aggression. To start, the
term Western Front itself is a rather adjunct expression when referring to the extermination of Jews
in occupied western countries. Unlike in the East, where German troops near the frontlines were
responsible for organizing the destruction of local Jews, soldiers fighting in the West--both in 1940
and after 1944--were not burdened with such duties. Berlin, however, still tasked the occupational
governments in the West with contributing their share to the Final Solution. As declared by Dr.
Elmar Michel, economic chief of the military government in occupied France, German authorities
“‘must do what is necessary to eliminate [French] Jews even after the occupation.’”53 Though,
Michel admitted that the military government alone “‘cannot...provide sufficient manpower to deal
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with the great number of Jewish enterprises’” still operating in France.54 Wehrmacht forces on the
Western Front were still at work executing the final stages of the Blitzkrieg in 1940 and enacting
cohesive defenses and counteroffensives thereafter. Thus, Michel resolved “‘to have the French
authorities participate in the elimination of Jews’” in France.55 Such simple resolve--formed almost
entirely out of necessity--illustrates the Nazi regime and Wehrmacht’s less severe views toward
the war in the West as well as the countries and populations Germany now dominated.
While German animosity toward the occupied countries and cultures of Western Europe
nowhere near emulated the brute hatred of the Eastern Front, Wehrmacht troops still held
reservations about the people they dominated. Following the establishment of the military
occupation in France, infantryman Karl Fuchs, observing French culture, wrote how one “‘can
truly see that in the areas of cleanliness and morality, the French people have skidded to a new
low.’”56 While the Nazi regime deemed Jews and Slavs the filth of humanity in the East, the French
were viewed more as second-class citizens in both race and social status. Despite being inherently
inferior to the Germans, Nazi ideologues considered the French a competent people with whom
local power sharing was permissible. This was especially bolstered by France’s swift military
defeat as well as French conservatives’ willingness to collaborate with the occupying Germans; a
fate which Great Britain was unwilling to accept. Revealing the German military’s tactical
frustration with Britain, Fuchs confidently wrote in August of 1940 how “‘the days are numbered
for those bums over there in England’” who soon “‘won’t be able to attack German cities and
peaceful farms anymore.’”57 Placing immense confidence in Germany’s military superiority, he
predicted that “‘once we’re over there, no one will show any mercy whatever, no matter who’s
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involved.’”58 Since the British presented a competent defense, halting the Blitzkrieg at the English
Channel, German soldiers held primarily tactical--as opposed to racial--animosity toward their
stubborn adversaries. These tactical frustrations would continue well after the failed Battle of
Britain when the Western Front reopened in 1944.
With the launch of Operation Overlord and the Allied invasion of Normandy in June of
1944, Wehrmacht soldiers were reengaged in extensive combat. Only now, they were on the
defensive, working feverishly, yet confidently, to repel the Western Allies. Wehrmacht soldiers
also continued their narrow, tactical animosity towards their British and American counterparts
along the front. Although, such animosity remained less severe than the racially motivated,
brutalized, and desensitized hatred held against Soviet soldiers and partisans in the East. Veteran
Heinz Hickmann asserted that German soldiers “‘had no respect for the American soldier’” since
the Americans, as cited by another soldier, “‘liked a bit too much comfort’” in preparation for
battle.59 Again, German soldiers confidently dismissed their western adversaries in favor of their
own training and self-diagnosed tactical superiority. Similarly, in paratrooper Martin Pöppel’s
interactions with British soldiers in Sicily, he noted how “they were ‘certainly not eager to fight,
and [that] their equipment look[ed] fairly pathetic.’”60 Pöppel described British fighting “‘spirit
[as] none too good’” and that “‘they tend to surrender as soon as they face the slightest [enemy]
resistance.’”61 Furthermore, conversing with a Canadian prisoner of war in September of 1943,
Pöppel noted that the Canadians, too, “‘are by no means hungry for battle and don’t know why
they are fighting.’”62 Notably absent from these criticisms is any mention of the Western Allies’
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subhuman, racial inferiority commonly cited in the East. The pitiful forces of the West, many
German soldiers believed, were no match against Germany’s tactical, military superiority.
Only later did Pöppel reluctantly identify any tactical skill or advantages possessed by the
Western Allies along the front. Initially, he “professed admiration only for [American] medical
equipment and rations” during the Normandy Campaign.63 As fighting in France intensified,
Pöppel slowly recognized the Americans’ tactical and material advantage over the German
military. After he was taken captive by advancing American forces, Pöppel was awestruck as he
and his captors “‘drove past kilometer after kilometer of Allied artillery positions,’” amounting to
“‘thousands of guns.’”64 In his bitter analysis of the Americans’ material advantages, he concluded
that Germany’s motto “‘was always ‘Sweat Saves Blood,’ but with [the Americans] it was,
‘Equipment Saves Men.’’”65 Crucially, Pöppel’s animosity and analysis of Allied soldiers in the
West did not foster his brutalization, even as his preconceived notions of German military
superiority lay in ruin. The brutalized sentiment and desperate attrition of racialized warfare in the
East was largely absent from most soldier accounts of the Western Front. Soldiers, much like the
Wehrmacht’s occupational regimes, maintained two separate camps for executing one’s tactical
duties and then Hitler’s greater campaign to annihilate Western European Jewry. The Wehrmacht
felt little pressure to intertwine these camps due to the individual duties of both local and German
occupational authorities. Despite placing Jewish influence at the heart of capitalism and
imperialism--completing the trifecta of National Socialism’s nonsensical Jewish-Bolshevikcapitalist conspiracy--Hitler’s regime did not relate the Western Allies to the greater Jewish
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menace. The Western Front, therefore, took on the appearance of an almost secondary battle
against capitalism and imperialism; second, that is, to the war against world Jewry in the East.
This is not to say, however, that Wehrmacht soldiers did not enact violence against local
Jews in occupied western countries. For instance, after the German military conquered Belgium
and established an occupational regime in May of 1940, Wehrmacht soldiers participated in
antisemitic violence on their own initiatives. One month later, the deputy police commissioner in
Antwerp received reports “from [local] Jews that they had been beaten up in the marketplace by
German soldiers.”66 These Belgian Jews “‘were stepped on, beaten up, mishandled, pulled by
[their] beards’” and only when “‘threatened with a revolver’” were they allowed “‘to flee the
marketplace.’”67 But, for the most part, the execution of the Final Solution in the West was
orchestrated by the higher echelons of the German occupational authorities. Ironically, the
Wehrmacht official at the head of Belgium’s military government, Alexander von Falkenhausen,
was not as fervently antisemitic as one might expect for a deputy selected by Hitler’s regime. To
prove himself a devout National Socialist worthy of such a high position, Falkenhausen was in no
doubt antisemitic, but only “to an extent that fell short of Nazi [Hitler’s] standards.”68 Similarly,
the commander of the military government in France, Otto von Stülpnagel, was also a more
reserved, less radicalized antisemite. Stülpnagel routinely found ways to lessen both the impact
and outreach of the Final Solution in France. As a counter to the ‘Aryanization’ of Jewish
businesses, he informed the Supreme Commander of the German Army, Walther von Brauchitsch,
in January of 1941 “that he approved of registering Jewish businesses, but that there was no legal
precedent for confiscating them.”69 Unfortunately, there was little these top officials could do to
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dampen the demands of Hitler’s war against world Jewry. With limited access to reserve resources
and manpower, Stülpnagel required French assistance to enact his military government’s
contribution to the Final Solution.
In Western Europe, the goals of the Final Solution relied largely on the acquiescence of
local authorities and conservative puppet regimes. France offers a leading example of this dynamic
due to its considerable geographic size and prominent, collaborationist Vichy regime. Despite the
military and civil dominance of German occupation authorities in France, members of the military
government “recognized that...their objectives concerning Jews” could be achieved “only ‘if the
French people decide to liberate themselves from Judaism.’”70 This created an awkward dichotomy
between the Germans’ administrative mechanisms mandating Jewish persecution and the extent
of French collaboration. One of the leading German agencies in France tasked with persecuting
non-German Jews was the Einsatzstab Rosenberg--or ‘special action staff’ Rosenberg--headed by
Nazi ideological theorist Alfred Rosenberg. Rosenberg’s agency began operations in July of 1940
and was initially “charged with repossessing property that Jews had allegedly stolen from
Germany.”71 However, German Ambassador to Vichy France Otto Abetz, in conjunction with the
military government, “feared that these measures would damage their efforts at collaboration” with
the Vichy regime.72 Berlin’s predatory demands threatened the already delicate power sharing
dynamic between the German occupation authorities and their French collaborators. Though, once
Hitler officially backed the actions of the Einsatzstab, Abetz “changed his tune over the
repossessions, and placated the French authorities by placing them on a ‘legal’ footing.”73 Hitler
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would not simply allow French Jews to evade his determined, transnational war against world
Jewry, nor their ultimate destruction.
Fearing the Nazi regime’s reaction to delaying Jewish persecution, Stülpnagel’s military
government forced its administrative hand in France to appease the Führer. On August 26, 1940,
the military government issued a directive stating “‘the Jews, with their anti-German attitude and
their multifaceted connections to the unoccupied part of France...are carrying out anti-German
espionage...or are at least supporting [it].’”74 As evidence, the directive cited “‘the presence of
Jews at public disturbances, [such] as the demonstration on 20 August in Paris,’” referencing
Parisian protests against wartime rationing.75 With this convenient justification, the military
government could openly persecute French Jews as a way to defend German interests in occupied
France. In October of 1941, Carl-Theo Zeitschel, a former physician for the German merchant
marine made Jewish specialist for the military government, first advocated to radicalize Jewish
persecution in France. Zeitschel “proposed the deportation ‘to the East’ of all the Jews in [French]
‘concentration [internment] camps...because of [a] lack of space in the camps [italics mine].’”76
The first seeds of mass Jewish deportations eastward had been sown. In March of 1941, the military
government also established a General Secretariat for Jewish Affairs with the Vichy regime’s
approval. The General Secretariat was “charged with proposing legislative measures against Jews,
fixing dates for liquidating Jewish property and designating trustees” to execute these agendas.77
As a result, “German and French officials together ‘Aryanized’ 43 per cent of Jewish business”
between the military occupation and the end of the war; a relatively low percentage compared to
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the efforts in Germany after 1933.78 These sluggish efforts to appease Hitler’s antisemitic
initiatives placed Stülpnagel’s government in a precarious position with both the Nazi regime and
local French authorities. With Berlin calling for total Jewish annihilation and the Vichy French
supporting more reserved approaches, German occupational authorities were caught in an
antagonistic crossfire. Entering the summer of 1941, Stülpnagel’s diplomatic situation grew
increasingly complicated as Germany extended the war eastward.
In many cases, the persecution and subsequent resettlement--or forced deportation--of Jews
in the West heightened after the invasion of the Soviet Union. With the initiation of Hitler’s radical,
racialized war of extermination in the East, the Wehrmacht became increasingly incorporated into
the Final Solution on all fronts. In Belgium, one month after the invasion of the Soviet Union,
Falkenhausen’s military government reported that “‘despite their relatively small significance,...a
systematic proceeding against the Jews was necessary, in order to come into line with how they
are handled in other areas occupied or influenced by Germany.’”79 Falkenhausen knew this drastic,
irrational demand for Jewish persecution would not bode well amongst the Belgian people. It was
clear to the German occupation authorities that the less antisemitic “‘Belgian authorities’”--while
ordered by the military government--“‘cannot be expected to work loyally’” towards the radical
persecution of Jews.80 Instead, the military government in Belgium formed its own agency, the
Treuhandgesellschaft, to organize such work as well as “an association of Belgian Jews” in
November of 1941 “to help promote and facilitate Jewish ‘emigration’” eastward. 81 Thus,
initiating the destruction of Belgium’s Jewish population by exporting it eastward. Feeding off the
motto ‘out of sight, out of mind,’ Falkenhausen’s military government attempted to mitigate the
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tension between itself and the Belgian authorities while simultaneously appeasing Hitler’s Final
Solution. Such an approach was duplicated by most German occupational regimes, benefitting
from the brutalized war of extermination in the East.
In France, internal tensions continued to swell after the launch of Hitler’s eastern war of
extermination. Military government commanders Otto and Carl-Heinrich Stülpnagel--both cousin
and successor to Otto von Stülpnagel in early 1942--failed to exert the Nazis’ radicalized,
antisemitic initiatives to the degree desired by Hitler’s regime. Following the late summer, 1941
assassinations of three German military personnel in separate partisan attacks, Hitler “urged a
ruthless response” in the form of mass reprisal killings executed by the Wehrmacht in France.82
Stülpnagel, however, “ordered the shooting of only ten people, far fewer than Hitler wanted.”83
Justifying his reserved actions, Stülpnagel “maintained...that limiting the number of executions
was encouraging the French authorities to cooperate” since it sufficiently “remind[ed] them of the
consequences of not cooperating.”84 With Berlin pressing him to act increasingly ruthless,
Stülpnagel remained persistent. Even into October of 1941, he “pleaded that shooting [Jewish and
other civilian] hostages only damaged collaboration and that more effort should go into finding
the actual culprits” of partisan attacks.85 Therefore, embodying a plea to judicial action amongst
Germany’s greater, militarized paranoia and demand for retribution.
Stülpnagel was quite forward with his convictions. He asserted that “‘based on [his own]
knowledge of the French population,’” only “‘limited executions,...and not mass executions, will
work’” to deter resistance and ensure collaboration.86 He later reaffirmed his theory that “‘these
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measures in no way [negatively] affect French people,’” stating how violent reprisals only instigate
“‘those individuals who are in the service of Germany’s enemies...and who are intent on thwarting
Franco-German reconciliation.’”87 Stülpnagel was content with a limited doctrine of both Jewish
and French partisan persecution; a complete disconnect from the radical, Machiavellian doctrine
demanded by Berlin. Directly comparing the conduct of the Eastern Front to that of his military
government in France, Stülpnagel strongly “‘warned against [the] Polish methods [of mass Jewish
exterminations and civilian reprisals] in France.’”88 To his great dismay, the German architects of
the Final Solution began demanding mass Jewish deportations eastward to bring France into line
with other occupied countries.
Stülpnagel’s bitter reluctance to permit mass Jewish executions and deportations clashed
directly with the more aggressively antisemitic SS who were also operating within France. By July
of 1944, SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler “claimed that Stülpnagel’s difficult, obtrusive
behavior was preventing the complete annihilation of the French Jews.”89 As a direct result,
“indigenous police forces, collaborators and administrators did the main legwork of processing
and assembling Jews for collection across the western occupied territories.”90 Committing to the
initiative, the Vichy regime was quick to enact its own pre-existing antisemitism under the consent
of the German military government. Vichy French antisemitism, however, did not mirror its
racialized, National Socialist counterpart. Xenophobia was still the driving influence behind
antisemitism in France. According to historians Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton, France’s
xenophobic antisemitism stemmed from the fiscal and social devastation of the Great Depression.
During the Depression, “refugees”--and especially Jewish refugees--“were rivals for jobs” in a
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devastated economy and “threatened to weaken French culture” through cultural diversity.91
Amongst the French workforce, foreign “Jews appeared more as rival workers than as predatory
capitalists,” fostering “the existence of working-class xenophobia.”92 Similarly, intellectuals
feared foreign permeation into French culture. Intellectuals “blam[ed such] troubles on foreign
competition, especially from Jews,” as conservative institutions like the Action française lamented
the Jewish domination of France’s film and radio industries.93 As the effects of the Great
Depression lingered in France until the dawn of war, xenophobic antisemitism prevailed
throughout the interwar years. Although, French antisemitism, too, harbored its own paranoia,
induced by the tense years preceding the Second World War.
Coupled with the growing threat of German military aggression, French antisemitism was
increasingly influenced by the nation’s fear of international confrontation prior to the outbreak of
war. Revealing their general paranoia over involvement in a second, daunting world conflict, the
French believed refugees “were eager to drag [them] into dreaded international complications.”94
This sentiment most prominently targeted foreign, refugee Jewish communities as Hitler’s regime
rapidly radicalized Jewish persecution in Germany. Marrus and Paxton detail how both the French
public and authorities worried that “German Jews could poison relations with Germany.”95 To
illustrate this fear, they cite the extradition of German-Polish-Jewish refugee Herschel Grynszpan
to Germany after he assassinated diplomat Ernst vom Rath at the German embassy in Paris on
November 7, 1938. In response, “the French public blamed [Grynszpan] for increasing the risk of
war with Germany” while “French authorities,” fearing similar rebellious outbreaks, “tightened

91

Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 24-25.
Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 24-25.
93
Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 25.
94
Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 24.
95 Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 24-25.
92

https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol8/iss1/2

26

Calcaterra: Administration Versus Extermination

their surveillance of foreigners.”96 As Kristallnacht devastated Jewish communities in Germany
following Rath’s assassination, France’s xenophobic antisemitism gained increasing support. As
a result, xenophobic antisemitism became firmly grounded amongst the Vichy collaborationists
who rose to power following the German occupation.
Subject to the demands of German occupational authorities, the Vichy regime quickly
employed its xenophobic antisemitism to appease Hitler’s agenda. Initially, the Vichy regime only
condoned the rounding up and deportation “of Jews who were not of French citizenship.”97 So, in
July of 1942, “French police and collaborators swept up thirteen thousand stateless Jews in Paris”
during the notorious Vel d’Hiv round-up, contributing to the nearly 42,000 Jewish deportees
amassed by year’s end.98 In his politically self-serving observations of Jewish deportations in
October of 1944, veteran of the Legion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism (LVF) Pierre
Rusco emphasized the conservative, xenophobic antisemitism of the Vichy regime. In his own
rendition of the events, Rusco recalled seeing Jews “‘rushing forward’ to board a [‘resettlement’]
train” since “the Russians were coming, and even Jews...would rather flee toward the country that
has ostracized them than have to deal with the wild, barbarian hordes pouring in from the East.”99
Alongside the Germans’ paranoid hatred of Judeo-Bolshevism, Rusco reveals how Vichy
antisemitism depicted non-French Jews as the despised other based upon nationality or, as Rusco
identifies, statelessness. Despite its own antisemitism, the Vichy regime shared Stülpnagel’s
concern over deporting assimilated Jewish citizens and its effect on the greater population. Vichy
officials “feared that deporting assimilated French Jews to the extermination camps [in the East]
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would dangerously unsettle the wider population” of the country.100 Through the collective
reservations of the Vichy French and Stülpnagel’s military government, the proportion of French
Jews to die during the Holocaust totaled around twenty-five percent; a percentage far less than the
staggering seventy-five percent of Dutch Jews, for instance.101 Now, both Stülpnagel and the
Vichy French stood at odds with the initiatives of Hitler’s regime. Over in Belgium,
Falkenhausen’s military government fared no better.
In Belgium, indigenous antisemitism also revolved around the notion of xenophobia, but
was even more so reserved than in France. This, in large part, can be attributed to the fact Jews
“retained a fringe presence in [Belgian] society and had made less effort to assimilate.”102 Thus,
remaining more or less separate from the rest of society and difficult to trace. Falkenhausen’s
military government “calculated correctly that the Belgian authorities were not prepared to see
Belgian Jews deported,” but would allow the deportation of Jewish “‘emigrants and other
foreigners,’ as long as the German police rather than the Belgian police did the job.” 103 With that
said, foreign Jews accounted for “90 per cent of the 10,000 Jews who were deported in September
1942” from Belgium.104 Focusing almost entirely on the motto ‘out of sight, out of mind,’ Belgian
collaborators refused to partake in deporting Jews even if they believed foreign Jews should be
purged from Belgian society. So, German police forces, along with the help of willing Belgian
authorities, organized the rapid deportation of reportedly stateless Jews from Belgium. But, after
the cruel treatment of Jews by German policemen was revealed to the Belgian public, the military
government “scaled back the hunt, [and] forbade further large-scale ‘cleansing’ actions.”105 In
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total, approximately 25,000 Jews were deported between the efforts of the German police,
Wehrmacht, and collaborationist forces, resulting in the deportation of “40 per cent of the country’s
prewar Jewish population” by war’s end.106 Considering Belgium’s smaller geographic size and
minimal local resistance, Jewish deportations produced far ghastlier results than did the
complicated efforts of the Vichy regime and Stülpnagel’s military government in France.
Perhaps the greatest factor explaining the disconnect between Hitler’s genocidal initiatives
and Vichy French collaboration lies in their differing cultures rather than objectives. That is,
humanist aspects of French culture and national attitude permeated even the staunchest Vichy
ideology, even its antisemitism. Members of both the Vichy and Nazi regimes have referred to this
effect merely as ‘Frenchness.’107 Pierre Rostaing, a career soldier and veteran of the Legion of
French Volunteers Against Bolshevism (LVF), best describes the aspects of ‘Frenchness’ the
Germans so readily despised. Rostaing explained “that his countrymen...cultivate[d] demeanors
like ‘we don’t give a shit’” as well as “‘anger and grumbling [rohne et grange]’” at orders from
their German superiors.108 While referencing the petty insubordination and individuality of LVF
volunteers, Rostaing accurately described the Vichy regime’s skepticism toward Berlin’s radically
antisemitic demands. Such skepticism revealed the French collaborators’ ability to think on their
own initiative, outside the blind control of Hitler and Berlin. Free thinking of which concealed
appeals to reason amongst the irrationality of antisemitism and the Holocaust. Described as the
“‘Voltaire’s smile’” by collaborationist writer Alphonse de Châteaubriant, “France’s main
liabilities” in contributing to indiscriminate Jewish persecution was a sense of subjective
reasoning.109 Châteaubriant’s thesis concludes that the interaction between Hitler’s regime in
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Berlin and the Vichy regime in France was “a clash of mentalities between the two cultures.”110
Notably absent from this conclusion is any mention of race or the need to undermine and eliminate
the enemies of French culture. Giving life to their ‘Voltaire smile,’ Vichy and other French
collaborationists argued that since “France was a ‘civilized’ country, [its Jewish population] should
be treated differently from the ‘culturally inferior’ nations of Eastern Europe.”111 Thereby, the
objective of Hitler’s total war of extermination against world Jewry appeared overly inclusive to
French collaborationists. The Vichy regime simply valued nationality and nationalism over
indiscriminate, racialized genocide.
Even radically antisemitic officials in the Vichy regime exhibited aversion to the Nazis’
perception of French Jews. Xavier Vallat, the Commissioner-General for Jewish Questions in the
Vichy government, offers a prominent example of this divide between the French and their German
overlords. According to Marrus and Paxton, “Vallat renounced the Nazis’ racialist antisemitism in
favor of a more benign cultural form” through which “‘Jews [were] bearable in homeopathic
doses.’”112 Elaborating his argument, Vallat stated how trace remnants of Jewish culture
“‘sufficiently diluted...the undeniable qualities of their race.’”113 Thus, employing the term race in
a more collective, cultural context rather than one of bloodline or National Socialist pseudoscience.
Vallat also argued that French nationalism and ethnicity were critical mechanisms protecting
certain Jews from deportation, despite German demands. He asserted that “Jews who showed
‘attachment to this country [France]’” were inherently less threatening than the persistent
“‘saturation’” of Jewish culture--perceived as inherently foreign--in French society.114 With
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Berlin’s increasing demands for Jewish deportations in the final months of 1941--coinciding with
the war of extermination in the East--Vichy officials felt pressured to maintain French national
dignity and honor. That is, through their continued promise to protect French Jews from the same
roundups and deportations they encouraged for the masses of foreign Jewish refugees in France.
Ironically, Vichy French antisemitic policy held no official distinction between domestic
and foreign Jews until the end of 1941. Vichy officials readdressed this lack of distinction
following the humiliating arrest and deportation of 743 “professional [Parisian] men and
intellectuals” or otherwise “‘notable [Jewish] personages’” in December of 1941--i.e. Jewish
business leaders and military veterans of French ethnicity.115 Ensuring French national dignity
through its reliance on xenophobic antisemitism, the “Vichy [regime] focused its anti-Jewish
policy more directly against foreigners.”116 Attempting to maintain the ethnic interests of France
contrary to Hitler’s demands, Vichy officials radicalized their pre-existing xenophobic
antisemitism. The primary targets of this upsurge in persecution were, again, Jewish refugee
communities who fled Nazi persecution westward after 1933. On January 2, 1942, the Vichy
regime declared that all foreign Jews who fled to France after January 1, 1936, “had to be
reassigned either to [forced] labor battalions...or, for those with resources, assigned to a
residence.”117 Notably, little antisemitic Vichy doctrine released after 1941 officially included
French Jews in their efforts to appease the Nazi regime. Instead, Vichy officials attempted to
protect French Jews, labeling them French nationals and not subhuman Jewry, at the expense of
other, easily identifiable foreign Jewish communities. The January 1942 doctrine also reveals the
importance of socio-economic status to the Vichy French relative to their xenophobic
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antisemitism. If a foreign Jew was economically prosperous, he too could evade the labor
battalions and, shockingly, earn residency! Therefore, it is unfortunately no surprise that nearly
two-thirds of Jewish deportees from France, whose lives were claimed by the Holocaust, “were
foreign-born refugees.”118 With the Vichy regime’s stubborn reluctance to deport French Jews,
Berlin struggled to urge French collaborationists to diligently execute its racialized initiatives.
Such a subjective disconnect further complicated the Vichy regime’s participation, if not
acquiescence, in the Holocaust. In his postwar testimony, SS Hauptsturmführer Dieter Wisliceny
confirmed that “the Vichy government [reluctantly] agreed to the deportation of French citizens”
in August of 1941.119 But, they continued their “resistance to the deportations” well into the
summer of 1942, resulting in “a general halt to the [Jewish] deportations” in France.120 Even some
German occupation officials stalled their orders after reading the underlying messages of both
Stülpnagel’s military government and the Vichy regime. In late 1942, Adolf Eichmann “accused
the commander of the Sipo in Paris”--short for Sicherheitspolizei, or Secret Police--“Dr. Helmut
Knochen, of sabotaging” Eichmann’s efforts to rapidly deport French Jews. 121 Peculiarly,
Eichmann did not directly ridicule the military government or Stülpnagel, who allowed such stalls
in Jewish deportation to occur. Furthermore, in an attempt to mitigate the deportation of French
Jews, Vichy Chief of State Philippe Pétain “asserted [to the Germans] that he could not understand
why Jews of French nationality were being deported when there were so many other Jews in France
[italics mine].”122 Thus, continuing to divert German attention away from French Jews and onto
those already unwelcomed in France due to their innately foreign statelessness. As for assimilated

118

Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 263.
Dieter Wisliceny in Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, vol. 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial
Extermination, 601-602.
120
Wisliceny in Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, vol. 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination, 605.
121
Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, vol. 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination, 602-603.
122
Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, vol. 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination, 609.
119

https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol8/iss1/2

32

Calcaterra: Administration Versus Extermination

French Jews who obtained citizenship before the Nationality Law of 1927, Vichy authorities
considered them “in a different light from the émigré Jews” who fled persecution in Germany or
Eastern Europe.123 Despite the destruction of approximately 72,500 French Jews by war’s end,
Vichy French skepticism toward Hitler’s racialized campaign mitigated Jewish deportations
eastward. Skepticism of which presented considerable internal resistance to the Nazis’ genocidal
project in France.

Perpetrating and Enduring the War of Extermination in the East

Historians, however, are still left with the question of why ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers
actively participated in Hitler’s genocidal campaigns on the Eastern Front. As war with the
Western Allies resumed, Alsatian infantry volunteer Guy Sajer explained how combat in the East
increasingly brutalized his fellow German soldiers. Thus, numbing them to the value of human life
while simultaneously causing them to fear death. Sajer recalled how “he and his companions were
‘physically destroyed’ by the hardships” of war in the East.124 He wrote how German soldiers
“‘were sleepy,’” but “‘knew that [they] couldn’t sleep as long as a Bolshevik was alive’” since
death could only come to “‘either them or us.’”125 Similarly, one Wehrmacht Corporal detailed the
feared Judeo-Bolshevik invasion into Germany seemingly ensured by their unthinkable defeat in
the East. The Corporal resolved that “‘a complete destruction [of Bolshevism] is...required,’”
fearing how, “‘if these bestial hordes of soldiers were to fall upon Germany[,] all would be gone
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that is German.’”126 Under this intensely paranoid psychological state, divisions of German
soldiers deteriorated into a frenzy for survival against the Soviets.
For many soldiers, the enemy was no longer human, but an omnipresent entity which
sought their gruesome destruction. In his postwar reflections, veteran Harry Mielert stated that “‘as
a soldier, you don’t think [of the enemy] as an individual at all.’”127 Instead, he explained how
soldiers in the East “‘shoot at ‘profitable targets’’” so that one does not have to think about killing
someone else’s father or husband.128 Moreover, one Wehrmacht Corporal described the bitter,
irrational hatred soldiers along the Eastern Front shared for their Soviet counterparts. He fumed
about how Soviet soldiers and partisans were “‘no longer people, but wild hordes and beasts, who
have been bred by Bolshevism in the last twenty years.’”129 Revealing his own inhuman
brutalization, the Corporal concluded that “‘one must not allow any sympathy to grow for these
people.’”130 According to historian Stephen Fritz, the National Socialist indoctrination of
Wehrmacht soldiers, combined with the psychological damage of Eastern Front combat, warped
their collective perception of the enemy--the other. This festering environment of fear and hatred
corrupted these men to such a high degree “that the unthinkable became banal.”131 German
soldiers’ desensitizing indoctrination, coupled with the barbarization of warfare and the lurking
fear of partisans, allowed “these men [to] not think of the innocent human beings who were being
killed but worried instead about the consequences to them personally” if they did not kill.132 Such
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brutalized physical and psychological conditions fostered the perfect environment for Wehrmacht
soldiers to willingly participate in Hitler’s eastern war of extermination.
One of the leading psychological mechanisms that enabled German soldiers to both endure
combat and scrupulously kill unarmed civilians was the concept of comradeship, or
Kameradschaft. Although, according to historian Thomas Kühne, the Wehrmacht’s
implementation of soldierly comradeship differed tremendously from its prewar interpretation.
During the Interwar Period, earlier notions of soldierly comradeship were “reserved to a humane
type of sociality,” hindering the ability of trained soldiers to fight tenaciously.133 As explained by
one Nazi insider in the 1930s, “the humanity of comradeship suited the citizen,” implying that it
“only constrained the radicalization of violence [the Nazi regime] craved.”134 Such humanizing
sentiment clashed with Hitler’s desire for relentless and ruthless efficiency in both military
maneuvers and executing his mass extermination campaigns. In the National Socialist
reinterpretation of comradeship, “civilian selves...managed to overcome their individualities,
egoisms, or class identities as soldiers.”135 These soldiers would “eventually merg[e] into the
entirety of the soldierly community,” and form “the nucleus of the ideal [German] nation.”136
Formerly central to the intent of comradeship, Hitler’s political and military leadership
discouraged civilian identity within the ranks of the Wehrmacht. National Socialist comradeship
sought to remove all aspects of civilian individuality from the refined friendships of nationalistic,
charismatic warriors. Hitler intended to create a superior Kampfgemeinschaft, or ‘Combat
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Community,’ of ‘brothers in arms’ committed to the grueling, even genocidal, campaigns launched
by his regime.
As the Wehrmacht struggled to cope with the brutalized, paranoid combat of the Eastern
Front, Hitler’s reinterpretation of comradeship quickly turned violent. Officers noted how “a
‘guerrilla-psychosis’ spread through the troops” as fierce eastern “resistance cast doubt on the
alleged racial, moral, and physical superiority” of the German invaders.137 This “fear of guerrillas”
fostered a “fear of one’s own weakness” in the Wehrmacht, dissolving professional soldier
comradery.138 Furthermore, German soldiers were consistently caught between two opposing
moral systems during Hitler’s eastern war of extermination. The first mandated “mercy for the
unarmed civilian and a defeated enemy” from German combatants.139 The other, Nazi-augmented
system demanded “an ‘ethics’ that complies ‘solely with the needs of [the German] people’” and
the ‘National Community.’140 This created an evident dichotomy--as well as opportunities for
contradiction--in the actions expected of Wehrmacht soldiers in the East. In 1942, Private Erich
Kuby was appalled by the persistent violence and genocidal conduct of his surrounding Wehrmacht
comrades. Kuby noted how his peers “so ‘easily intertwined middle-class norms and barbarism,’”
simultaneously “‘play[ing] the role[s] of decent soldiers’” as well as “‘criminal accomplices.’”141
Like Kuby’s peers, many regular infantrymen became disillusioned under the guise of
professional, soldierly comradeship. These men could not formulate a moral link between their
work as professional soldiers and the persistent violence against civilian populations demanded by
Hitler’s regime.
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Similarly, German infantry on the Eastern Front were often conflicted by the excessive
violence prescribed against Soviet soldiers and partisans. In March of 1941, 250 Wehrmacht
generals received orders from Hitler to “‘forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers,’”
especially with foreign militants, as “‘a communist is no comrade before or after the battle.’”142
Such a blatant breach of traditional military comradeship sought an ulterior motive: “the genocidal
radicalization of warfare desired by the Nazis.”143 Feeding off the fear of eastern resistance and
ideological tensions between National Socialism and Bolshevism, the Wehrmacht changed its tone
along the Eastern Front. Wehrmacht generals could no longer accept the bonds of professional,
soldierly comradeship potentially interrupting the brutal eradication of Judeo-Bolshevik influence.
Echoing Hitler, General Halder proclaimed that his forces “must get away from the standpoint of
soldierly comradeship” as a “Communist is from first to last no comrade.”144 Halder also
summarized the Wehrmacht’s supposed legal justification for contributing to the Führer’s war of
extermination. He wrote that all Soviet intelligentsia were considered both racial and ideological
“criminals and must be treated as such,” falling into line “‘with [the] unprecedented, unmerciful,
and unrelenting harshness’” demanded by Hitler’s war in the East.145 The only solution to preserve
professional comradeship alongside Hitler’s genocidal campaigns was an escalation in violence,
curtailing mercy for suspected sources of resistance. Therefore, any futile bonds of transnational
humanity cracked under the pressure of the Eastern Front.
Loosely strung together by the remnants of National Socialist comradeship, Wehrmacht
soldiers broadened their destructive scope in favor of self-preservation on the front. This new,
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reactionary comradeship “exert[ed] a communal force against those who wrong[ed] the [German
military] or its members.”146 Under the pretext of “revenge ensures justice,” soldiers struck back
at “the whole group the wrongdoer belongs to, [and] not the individual.”147 This further radicalized
the violence exerted by the Wehrmacht, contributing towards the Nazi regime’s ultimate goal of
mass extermination. Detailing the bonds of German comradeship against the enemy, infantryman
Guy Sajer described his company commander’s fierce, passionate devotion to his men. Sajer wrote
how this man of “‘obvious and passionate sincerity’” stated that he “‘would burn and destroy entire
villages if by so doing [he] could prevent even one of [his men] from dying of hunger.’”148 Utilized
as both a physical and psychological mechanism of self-preservation, German comradeship
facilitated the widespread genocidal environment necessary to rapidly execute the Final Solution
in the East. Influenced by the fear of eastern resistance, “the morality of revenge and retribution
lured Wehrmacht soldiers into the Nazi genocidal project,” fostering “violent dynamism from the
intertwining of obligation and permission” to kill.149 Such confusing dynamism, complicated by
influences of National Socialist ideology, enabled Wehrmacht infantry to commit mass murder on
behalf of Hitler’s regime. Hence, Wehrmacht units were employed by their political and military
leadership to perpetrate Hitler’s campaigns of Judeo-Bolshevik extermination in the East.
Apart from Wehrmacht soldiers’ devotion to their comrades and fear of partisan activity,
individual combatants perpetrated mass murder for a wide array of reasons. In his renowned book
Ordinary Men, historian Christopher Browning analyzes one battalion of German men, Reserve
Police Battalion 101, and their motivations for rounding up and shooting Jews in Poland. Reserve
Police Battalion 101 provides a prominent case study into the varying justifications of men who
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agreed to kill, or not to kill, Jewish civilians in the East. When analyzing the murderous
motivations of the Battalion, it is important to understand that not all men were influenced by equal
justifications. Varying aspects of perpetrator individuality influenced the reserve policemen in
different ways. Three of the leading motivations detailed by Browning fall under the category of
the comradely us versus them, or the other principle: fear of social ostracization, perceptions of
masculinity, and obedience to authority. That is, within Reserve Police Battalion 101, the adoption
of “overtly nonconformist behavior, was simply beyond most of the men” as “it was easier for
them to shoot” than to face the social consequences if they did not.150 Thus, revealing an unsettling
combination of groupthink, comradeship, and fear of non-conformity amongst the men. Building
off Kühne’s concept of soldierly comradeship, non-shooters “risked isolation, rejection, and
ostracism” which presented “a very uncomfortable prospect within the framework of a tight-knit
unit stationed among a hostile population.”151 The fear of social ostracization forged an unspoken,
intangible commitment between the men in the Battalion, subconsciously submitting them to a
community governed by groupthink. Under such dangerous group dynamics, other motivations
quickly took root as the men subconsciously feared becoming part of the outcasted other. This
established the groundwork for the reserve policemen’s murderous conduct, but does not fully
encompass all factors influencing them.
The men’s collective perception of their own masculinity, under the guidelines of National
Socialism, also set behavioral precedents which urged some to perpetrate murder. As a key feature
of Nazi ideology on gender roles, historian Lisa Pine explains that “the Nazi regime...vigorously
constructed and explicitly articulated aggressive and dominant models of masculinity.”152
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Therefore, masculinity in Nazi Germany “was characterized by ambition for promotion or
achievement, as well as attempts to displace or discredit peers or competitors.”153 It is in this
atmosphere that German men entered a “perpetual struggle...not only to acquire power but also
maintain it against all potential rivals”; a concept referred to as ubermensch, or ‘superman,’
denoting the “‘will to power.’”154 Several men in Reserve Police Battalion 101 took this perpetual
competition to heart. Those who opted out of shooting “pleaded not that they were ‘too good’ but
rather that they were ‘too weak’ to kill’” and voluntarily fulfill their duties.155 These admissions
reveal an underlying influence of masculinity through an idolization of strong-willed, dominant,
and determined male personas. Importantly, these admissions do not depict remorse for the evident
immorality of mass murder, but rather that these few men could not bring themselves to kill; a lack
of devotion to an otherwise justifiable cause. By refusing to shoot, non-shooters “only reaffirmed
the ‘macho’ values of the majority”--including the ability “to kill unarmed, noncombatant men,
women, and children”--in an effort “not to rupture the bonds of comradeship that constituted their
social world.”156 The men’s perceptions of an idyllic gritty, dominating masculine presence in the
field placed artificial shame onto the few who opted out of shooting. This sense of shame further
encouraged the murderous actions of the shooters, depicting them as the righteous, manly patrons
of their duties. Thus, fostering the image of a strong, masculine, murderous us versus a weak,
emasculated, non-shooter them within the Battalion.
Furthermore, the concept of German combatants’ obedience to authority should not be
understood in the same light as the rhetoric scapegoated by Nazi criminals in postwar trials. To
define the purpose of obedience to authority in Reserve Police Battalion 101, Browning cites the
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work of psychologist Stanley Milgram. Milgram concluded that “the notions of ‘loyalty, duty,
[and] discipline’” to a higher authority foster “moral imperatives overriding any identification with
the victim.”157 Attempting to legitimize their gruesome actions, the reserve policemen narrowed
their psychological and mental focus toward the Battalion’s authoritative duties. Thereby, using
the concept of authority as a catalyst to depersonalize and desensitize the men to the excesses of
the killing process. This helped the men construct a psychological barrier between themselves and
the immense number of Jewish victims they agreed to kill. Additionally, a “‘situational
obligation,’” as Milgram explained, “makes refusal [of orders] appear improper, rude, or even an
immoral breach of obligation” within the Battalion, placing the men into a self-generated “‘agentic
state.’”158 Again drawing upon groupthink dynamics, these men became willing tools of the Nazi
genocidal project out of their own psychological self-preservation combined, ironically, with
civilized courtesy to authority. The reserve policemen did not do so blindly, but as a deliberate
subordination of oneself to the concept of duty. Subsequently, “the killing process became
progressively easier,” making “brutalization...the effect of these men’s behavior” rather than its
cause.159 Thus, the psychological brutalization of seemingly obedient German combatants became
increasingly necessary for perpetrating Hitler’s war of extermination on the Eastern Front.

Conclusion: Eastern Extermination versus Western Administration

In conclusion, the Wehrmacht’s execution of the Final Solution differed tremendously
between the Eastern and Western Fronts of the Second World War. In the East, Hitler’s war of
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extermination against Judeo-Bolshevism demanded--but did not force--ordinary German soldiers
to perpetrate the mass murder of both Jews and Soviet partisans. Under the strenuous,
psychologically devastating climate of combat in the East, the Wehrmacht found itself operating
in a foreign, hostile environment. As a result of German soldiers’ National Socialist indoctrination,
such daunting combat quickly challenged their preconceived notions of both military and racial
superiority. Though, instead of appealing to reason and logic--which ultimately denounced their
inherent superiority--Wehrmacht soldiers located justification and consent within their ideological
training to enact their military and genocidal duties. Thus, leading to their steep brutalization in a
rather brief period of time. Through its own brutalization, the Wehrmacht was simultaneously
conditioned to perpetrate and endure Hitler’s genocidal initiatives in the East. Constructing
psychological barriers through soldierly comradeship, German soldiers willingly rounded up and
shot Jews and partisans in response to their victims’ symbolic threat to Germany.
On the Western Front, however, the tone of the Final Solution was much more reserved,
yet still sought the same end goal as Hitler’s war in the East. Since the Nazi regime’s racial
hierarchy deemed the people of occupied Western Europe second class citizens, local
collaborationist regimes played a central role in executing the Final Solution. While Wehrmacht
soldiers were busy fighting the Western Allies in 1940 and again in 1944, German occupational
authorities delicately mandated collaborationist regimes’ cooperation. The resulting power sharing
dynamic between the occupying, dominant Germans and local, collaborationist regimes fostered
the Western Front’s administrative occupation approach to the Final Solution. This awkward
dynamic enabled the subtle objections of the collaborationist French and Belgians to mitigate
Hitler’s indiscriminate deportation and annihilation of Jews from the West. Therefore,
Falkenhausen and Stülpnagel’s military governments failed to meet the killing standards achieved
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by the Wehrmacht in the East--ironically, much to their respective credit. Both occupational
German governments, as well as their local collaborators, lacked the racialized hatred and
psychological brutalization of soldiers in the East. Motivations of which festered only under the
daunting stress of war in the East. Without such irrational motivation, German administrative and
local collaborator resistance mitigated the Final Solution’s destruction of Jews in the West.
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